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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02973 01 OF 03 031732Z

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2304

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY GONN

AMEMBASSY LONDN

USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 2973

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP APRIL 5 REPORT TO NAC

1. BELOW IS TEXT OF INTRODUCTION AND PART ONE OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED ON MORNING OF APRIL 5 BY US REP AS SPOESMAN FOR AD HOC GROUP. PARTS TWO AND THREE HAVE ALREADY BEEN FORWARDED IN VIENNA 2829, AND REPORT SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE.

2. FOR USNATO: MISSION REQUESTED TO RUN OFF ENTIRE REPORT PARTS ONE, TWO AND THREE, IN SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF COPIES FOR DISTRIBUTION TO COUNCIL FOLLOWING ORAL REPORT BY US REP ON MORNING OF APRIL 5.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02973 01 OF 03 031732Z

BEGIN TEXT:

AD HOC GROUP REPORT OF APRIL 5, 1974

INTRODUCTION:

THIS REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA COVERS THE PERIOD FROM JANUARY 9, 1974 TO THE PRESENT. THE REPORT CONSISTS OF THREE MAIN PARTS.

PART ONE CONTAINS THE GROUP'S ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS: IN ESSENCE, THE GROUP BELIEVES THAT THE TALKS ARE GOING AS WELL AS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE AND THAT NO MAJOR CHANGE IN THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH IS REQUIRED AT THIS POINT.

PARTS TWO AND THREE OF THE REPORT DEAL WITH THE ONWARD DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. PART TWO CONTAINS SOME REQUESTS FROM THE GROUP FOR GUIDANCE ON QUESTIONS NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL. PART THREE LISTS SOME QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE EAST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR WHICH THE GROUP BELIEVES DESERVE EXAMINATION.

PART ONE: CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

I. OVERVIEW:

1. AS THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS COME TO THE END OF THE SECOND SESSION, THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES ON WHICH THEY FOCUSED ARE: (A) WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WILL BE PHASED IN THE WAY THE ALLIES WISH, OR WHETHER ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, AS URGED BY THE EAST; (B) WHETHER NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED; AND (C) WHETHER REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE SYMMETRICAL OR ASYMMETRICAL.

2. THE FIRST OF THESE POINTS HAS PROVED THE MAJOR FOCUS OF THE TALKS IN RECENT WEEKS. WHEN THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RECONVENED IN JANUARY, THE AD HCO GROUP DECIDED THAT ITS PRIORITY TACTICAL OBJECTIVE FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE SHOULD BE TO BRING THE EAST TO AGREE THAT REDUCTIONS BY ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION AND TO MOVE INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONTENT OF THE WESTERN PHASE I PROGRAM. IN THE ENSUING TWELVE WEEKS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE PURSUED THIS OBJECTIVE IN PLENARY SESSIONS, BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, AND INFORMAL

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02973 01 OF 03 031732Z

MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS.

3. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT AS YET INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED POSITION, AND THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING. THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN SUFFICIENT INDICATIONS OF MOVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL, WHICH WILL BE DESCRIBED LATER IN THIS REPORT, TO JUSTIFY CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE PRESENT TACTICAL OBJECTIVE.

4. PARALLEL WITH THE EFFORT TO BRING THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED CONCEPT OF PHASING, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO PRESENT AND DEVELOP THE OVERALL ALLIED POSITION AND HAVE ALSO GAINED SOME USEFUL INSIGHTS INTO EASTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD THEM.

5. AS REGARDS THE OTHER MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED IN THE SESSION, THE EAST HAS BEEN WILLING IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS TO DISCUSS GROUND FORCES SEPARATELY FROM AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. THIS IS A SMALL STEP FORWARD IN A PROCEDURAL SENSE. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME EASTERN HINTS, TO WHICH THIS REPORT WILL REFER LATER, THAT IN WHAT WOULD BE THE FIRST SYMBOLIC STAGE OF THEIR OWN PROPOSALS THE EAST MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MERELY TOKEN REDUCTIONS OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES OR POSSIBLY EVEN A FREEZE ON THESE FORCES. THIS COULD REFLECT SOME SLIGHT DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY. BUT THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF INDUCING THE EAST TO DISCUSS ONLY GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED.

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02973 02 OF 03 031753Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 VIENNA 2973

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

6. THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS AS YET AS REGARDS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. UP TO NOW, THE EAST HAS REJECTED BOTH ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF DISPARITIES WHICH JUSTIFIES THEM. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO LAY GREAT STRESS ON THE NEED FOR SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AS THE ONLY EQUITABLE METHOD OF REDUCTION.

7. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN ENERGETIC IN PRESSING THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS BY NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II MUST BE CONDITIONAL ON THE CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02973 02 OF 03 031753Z

AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. BUT SO FAR NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES. THE EAST HAS ATTACKED THIS CONCEPT AS A DEVICE TO ISOLATE ONE ELEMENT OF THE FORCES ON EACH SIDE AND THUS TO JUSTIFY REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO ARGUE AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF PARITY AS SUCH. BUT THEY MAINTAIN THAT THIS PARITY ALREADY EXISTS IN THE PRESENT OVERALL EAST-WEST FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA. IN MAKING THIS POINT, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FREQUENTLY CITE STATEMENTS BY ALLIED DEFENSE MINISTERS ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN OVERALL EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE.

8. AS REGARDS THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF SECURITY OF THE FLANKS, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ELABORATED IN THE PLENARIES ON THE CONCEPT THAT THE ARGUMENTS MUST SAFEGUARD AND NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, AND THE SAME POINT HAS BEEN MADE IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EXPLAINED THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT IN GENERAL TERMS. SO FAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN SIDE HAS NEITHER DIPUTED THIS ALLIED REQUIREMENT NOR REACTED TO IT.

9. ON STABILIZING MEASURES, THE ALLIES HAVE PRESENTED TO THE EAST THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF FOUR SUCH MEASURES. THE ONLY MOVEMENT THUS FAR IS HINTS OF POSSIBLE EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS EXCEPTIONS ON CEILING FOR REPLACEMENTS, ROTATIONS AND EXERCISES

AND EVEN HERE THE EAST FORMALLY STANDS BY ITS ARTICLE VI OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR CEILINGS WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS. HOWEVER, THE EAST HAS NOT PRESSED ITS EARLIER PROCEDURAL OBJECTION TO DISCUSSION OF MEASURES 2, 3, AND 4.

10. ON VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION, THE ALLIES HAVE REITERATED THEIR POSITION, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THESE SUBJECTS AS YET.

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02973 02 OF 03 031753Z

11. AS REGARDS DATA, THE EAST CONTINUES TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT DISCUSSION OF FUGURES IS PREMATURE. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES HAVE TAKEN UP A RECENT SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT BOTH SIDES SEEK TO AGREE ON A COMMON DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. THIS MAY PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR SUCH DISCUSSION.

12. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF COHESION; IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE ALL TACTICAL ISSUES BY CONSENSUS IN VIENNA AND WITHOUT RESORT TO SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR REFERRING ISSUES TO THE COUNCIL. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REMAINED BUSINESSLIKE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY APPEAR COMMITTED TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME AND CONTINUALLY SPEAK OF ACHIEVING FIRST RESULTS BY 1975, AN INTEREST WHICH MAY PROVE AN ASSET TO THE WEST.

II. ALLIED TACTICAL APPROACH:

13. THE COUNCIL WILL RECALL THAT, AFTER RECONVENING ON JANUARY 9, THE AD HOC GROUP REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE NEXT TACTICAL STEPS TO MOVE THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.

14. IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TACTICS AGREED UPON, THE GROUP DECIDED TO CONTINUE IN PLENARY SESSIONS TO PRESENT THEIR OVERALL APPROACH IN INCREASING DETAIL AND TO DEVELOP NEW SUPPORTING ARGUMENTATION. THEY ALSO AGREED ON AN EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE FOR INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH THE OTHER SIDE. UNDER THIS PROCEDURE, DESIGNATED ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, WORKING WITHIN THE GUIDELINES APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, AND REPORTING TO THE GROUP, HAVE ENGAGED IN EIGHT INFORMAL SESSIONS WITH SOVIET AND EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES BETWEEN FEBRUARY 27 AND APRIL 1.

15. IN THESE SESSIONS, WHICH HAVE PROVED THEIR USEFULNESS, THE ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES SOUGHT TO CONVINCE THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT IT WOULD BE

ADVANTAGEOUS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF US AND SOVIET
GROUND FORCES FIRST AND TO DEFER TREATMENT OF THE EASTERN
INTEREST IN REDUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN FORCES AND REDUCTION
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PAGE 04 VIENNA 02973 02 OF 03 031753Z

OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES TO A LATER POINT. THE ALLIES
WERE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS TO
ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE AND DID NOT EXPECT EARLY
CONCESSIONS FROM THE EAST.

16. SO FAR, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT
SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING THE EAST TO AGREE TO DEFER DIS-
CUSSION OF NON-US AND NON-SOVIET REDUCTIONS OR OF
NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS. IN PLENARY SESSIONS,
EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GENERALLY TAKEN A HARD LINE
AND INSISTED ON THE LETTER OF THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. THE
EAST HAS BACKED UP THIS INSISTENCE WITH A PRESS CAMPAIGN
WHICH IN POLEMICAL TERMS QUESTIONS THE SERIOUS INTENTIONS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED
REFUSAL TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, IN THE INFORMAL
SESSIONS, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02973 03 OF 03 031820Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 2973

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

OWN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE IT MORE
PALATABLE TO THE ALLIES.

III. EASTERN TACTICAL APPROACH:

17. AS PRESENTED IN THE INFORMAL SESSIONS, THE MAIN FEATURES
OF THIS EASTERN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL NOW SEEM TO BE
THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
FROM THE OUTSET BY A SMALL NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE, EQUAL FOR BOTH
SIDES AND APPLIED GLOBALLY, AND THAT THE REDUCTIONS WOULD INCLUDE
A TOKEN COMPONENT OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES.

18. ALLIES REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE
FUNDAMANTAL OBJECTIONS TO THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02973 03 OF 03 031820Z

THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT IT:

A. THE PROPOSAL TAKES THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES
AS THE BASIS OF REDUCTIOS. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS INEQUITABLE,
PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS GROUND FORCES, AND THE ALLIES
COULD NOT AGREE TO CODIFY IT IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.

B. THE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO
TAKE PART IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THE ALLIES HAVE
POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
WITHDRAWING AND REDUCING FORCES. THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO
THE EAST THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WILL
NOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES UNTIL THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF
CONFIDENCE HAVE BEEN CREATED. THERE MUST BE PRIOR US-SOVIET
REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AS THE
GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

C. A THIRD FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION TO THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION
PROPOSAL IS THAT IT INCLUDES REDUCTION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES.
TO INCLUDE THESE FORCES WOULD NOT REDRESS THE MAIN FORCE
IMBALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES,
AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING STABILITY OR
REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE

OFFERED THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS OF THEIR PROPOSAL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET SOME OF THE ALLIED OBJECTIONS:

A. THEY HAVE NOT ABANDONED THEIR REQUIREMENT THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, BUT HAVE STATED THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS COULD BE MINIMAL IN SIZE. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SEEM TO HAVE IMPLIED THAT A FREEZE ON THE FORCES OF NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT GO SOME WAY TO MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS.

B. STARTING FROM A POSITION OF SUGGESTING AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOW SPEAKING IN TERMS OF A TOKEN REDUCTION OF A FEW NUCLEAR MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT ONLY AND, ALSO IN THIS CASE, HAVE SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A FREEZE ON THESE FORCES.

C. THEY HAVE INDICATED, ALTHOUGH ONLY IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING THEIR OWN PROPOSAL, THAT THERE COULD IN EFFECT BE SEPARATE PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. THAT IS, THERE WOULD BE A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT TO BE IMPLEMENTED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02973 03 OF 03 031820Z

REDUCTIONS CONTINUE WITHOUT A BREAK.

D. STILL ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR OWN SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROGRAM, THEY HAVE STATED THAT PROVIDED ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TOOK PART, EACH SIDE COULD DETERMINE THE INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF ITS OWN REDUCTIONS, AND THE NEW LEVEL OF FORCES ON EACH SIDE FOLLOWING SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS COULD BE A SINGLE "GLOBAL" CEILING RATHER THAN ONE BASED ON NATIONAL CEILINGS. THESE ARE TWO CONCEPTS ON WHICH IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD IN THE FUTURE.

E. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT FOLLOWING POSSIBLE WITHDRAWALS OF THE FORCES OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD ACCEPT LIMITATIONS AGAINST RE-ENTRY OF THE WITHDRAWN FORCES. THIS COULD BE A STEP TOWARDS SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF A CEILING ON THEIR FORCES.

F. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED SOME WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCEPTIONS TO THESE CEILINGS TO PERMIT ROTATION, REPLACEMENT AND EXERCISES.

20. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SAID THAT WHILE THE ALLIES ARE WILLING TO EXPLORE ANY PROPOSAL THE EAST MAY ADVANCE, THE OBJECTIONS THE ALLIES HAVE PUT FORWARD TO THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL APPEAR TO THE ALLIES TO BE CONCLUSIVE ONES.

21. A THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN POSITION, GIVEN THE DIRECTION OF THE MOVES NOTED ABOVE, MIGHT EVEN BE TO DROP THE REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTION FROM THE OUTSET BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND TO OFFER A US-SOVIET FIRST PHASE IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE ON THE MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, PLUS A FREEZE ON ALL NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN THE AREA, AND BINDING COMMITMENTS AS TO

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